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NOTES
THIE LABILITY OF A CONSPIRATOR FOR

UNEXPECTED MURDER.

The following instruction by the Court in a trial for murder
of a co-conspirator was given in the recent case of State v.
Darling, u5 S. W. Rep.

1002

(Mo., Feb.

2, 19o9):

"If you

further believe.from the evidence that the defendant went with
his brother to the scene of the killing for the purpose of and
the inteption, if necessary, to aid, encourage, or to abet his
brother in assaulting the deceased, but that the defendant did
not know that his brother intended to use a deadly weapon in
making such assault, and did not know of.a felonious intent
on the part of the brother, but understood at the time that'it
(635)
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was the purpose and intention of the brother merely to whip
the deceased, yet the defendant is guilty of manslaughter." In
this case death was caused by a blow struck by defendant's
brother with a piece of iron which lie had concealed in his
hand.
The general rule undoubtedly is that, when several persons
conspire or combine together to commit an unlawful act, and
a homicide results, each is criminally responsible for the acts
of his associates or confederates if committed in furtherance,
or in prosecution of the common design for which they combined.' This general rule is not affected by the fact that homicide was not the result intended, or within the contemplation
of the parties as a part of the original design. 2 And at least
one court has gone to the extent of holding that it is no defence that the defendant forbade his associates to kill, or that
lie disapproved of the killling, oi regretted that any person
was killed, if, in fact, the killing was committed in the furtherance of the common design.3 Another court has held the
defendant liable for the homicide committed by his associatewhen done in furtherance of the common design, though it
was agreed that no killing was to be done by either party.'
The basis of these decisions is that where one person combines
with another to do an unlawful act, lie impliedly consents to
the use of such means, by his confederate, as may be necessary
or usual in the successful accomplishment of the act, and if
such means involve or result in a homicide, he is criminally
liable.'
As to just what the true test is in cases of this character is
not quite clear. It is clear that when the common design is to
effect death, the means employed is of no consequence, for all
are guilty if death result.' The same rules would seem to be
applicable in all cases where the object of the common design

'Martin v. State, 136 Ala. 32; People v. Oleson, 8o Cal. 122; Butler v.
People, 125 IIl. 641; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162; Corn. v. Campbell,
7 Allen, 541; State v. Johnson, 7 Ore. 210; Weston v. Coin., in Pa. 251;
Com. v. Miller, 4 Phila. 195; Blain v. State, 3o Tex. App. 702; Hays v.
State, 112 Wis. 304; U. S. v. Ross, i GalL 624.
1Evzats v. State, iog Ala. 22; Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99; People v.
T'asque:, 49 Cal. 56o; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. r; State v. Walker, 98 Mo.
95; Com. v. Mayor, 198 Pa. 29o; Mitchell v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. Rep.
278.

' People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 56o.
'State v. JohnSon, 7 Ore. 210.
' IVilliams v. State, 8i Ala. i; Lamb v. People, 96 IlL 73.
'People v. Lagroppe, go App. Div. 219; Carpenterv. State, 62 Arch.
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is to do acts of personal violence of such a nature as likely to
cause death. So where several persons enter into a conspiracy
to assault and beat another, and in carrying out such conspiracy the other is killed, each will be criminally liable therefor.*
The reason given in these cases is that when people assemble
themselves together with an intent to commit an unlawful act,
the execution of which makes probable, in the nature of
things, the commission of another crime which is incidental
to that which is the object of the conspiracy, they are responsible for such incidental crime. The courts have applied
the same rule also in conspiracies that have for their common
object the invasion of property rights, such as to commit larceny, burglary, robbery, etc.;s or where the common design is
to escape from confinement.0
In all the cases there must be shown a conspiracy or concert
for the purpose of effecting a common design; and in order
that the party not committing the act shall be criminally responsible for the act of his co-conspirator, the act of the coconspirator must be one within the scope of the common design
or purpose. The generally adopted test is, Did the parties act
together, and was the act done in pursuance of the common
design and purpose in which their minds had agreed? 0 The
real difficulty comes in determining just what are and what are
not acts within the common design. Shall the court restrict
the rule so as to include within the scope of the design only
those acts actually contemplated, or shall it be extended to
include also all the proximate, natural and logical consequences
of the execution of the common design? The latter seems to
be the generally accepted rule."' The act is generally held
to be within the scope of the common design if it is the
ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful act contemplated,
so that the connection between the acts is reasonably apparent,
286; Anon. v. People, 31 Colo. 351; Coin. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553;
Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99; Reg. v. Price,8 Cox. C. C. 96.
'Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121; Williams v. State, 81 Ala. x; State v.
Freeney, 41 Kansas, 1,5; Peden v. St., 61 Miss. 267; Reg. v. Price, 8

Cox C. C. 96.

'State v. Cannon, 49 S. C. 550; Hamilton v. People, 13 Ill. 34; Corn.
v. Mayor, 198 Pa. 29o; Mercersutith v. State, 8 Tex. App. 21!.
'People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628; People v. Flanigan,174 N. Y. 357;
State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 12r.
" Coin. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541; Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641;
Powers v. Coin., xio Ky. 386; King v. Plumnzer, 12 Mod. 627.
1 Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. r; Lamb v. People, 96 IlL 73; U. S. v. Boyd,
t5 Fed. 851

NOTES

and the act in question is not a fresh and independent product
of the mind of the confederate outside and foreign to the com2
This question is one for the determination of
mon design.'
13
the jury.
While it is quite impossible to lay down any definite and
hard rule as to just when a homicide results from the pursuit
of the common design; yet, the cases accord that a homicide
resulting from a personal assault with deadly weapons, or
which is likely to cause the use of deadly weapons, is an act
within the scope of the common design. 4 When the conspiracy is to commit some minor off nse ii the execution of which
the use of deadly weapons is not contemplated, nor can it
reasonably be expected that they will be used, the use of such
dangerous weapons cannot be deemed within the common intent and design of the parties. Thus, one who conspires with
another to commit a mere misdemeanor, such as an assault with
hands and fists, not dangerous to life, is not liable for the homicide, where the other uses weapons dangerous to life and kills
the party assaulted.' 5 This rule is not applied in a case, however, where the conspiracy was to fight with fists, and the
death was caused by a blow with the fist, the killing in such
case being the direct result of the conspiracy.' 8 In general the
cases support the rule that, where a number of persons enter
into an agreement to commit a criminal act, in the execution
of which a person is killed by one of them, all who enter upon
the commission of the criminal act and continue in its execution
up to the time of the killing are guilty of the murder, provided the act to be done is one which, from its nature, or the
way in which it is to be executed, may jeopardize or be dangerous to life, or is itself homicidal in character."T
It is hard to see how, under any of the better decided rules,
a conviction can be had in a case where the co-conspirators
have beforehand expressly agreed that the use of dangerous
weapons shall not be resorted to and death result from the use
Williams v State, 81 Ala I; State v. Valkcr, 98 Mo. 95.
"Martin v. Slate, 136 Ala. 32; Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37; People v.
Holmes, 118 Cal. 444; Powers v. Corn., 110 Ky. 386.
IsKirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 13; Bibby v. State, 65 S. W. 193;
Fergusonv. State, .34 Ala. 63; Reg. v. Price, 8 Cox C. C. 96.
'Powers v. Corn., 0xoKy. 386; Mercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App.
211; Brown v. State, 28 Ga., xg9; State v. May, 142 Mo. 135.
"Reg. v. Caton, 12 Col. C. C. 624.
U. S. v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851; Coin. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553;
Miller v. State, I5 Tex. App. 125; Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99.
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thereof. Such a conviction has been supported. 18 It can
hardly be said as a matter of law that an act was done in pursuance of the common intent, if the parties have agreed that
such act shall not be done. It might well be that such would
be a proper question for a jury to consider and determine
whether the expressed intent was in fact the real intent of
the parties. At least to secure a conviction of murder in the
first degree where premeditation and deliberation to kill must
be affirnmatively proved by the Commonwealth, it would seem
to be error to hold as a matter of law that a party to a conspiracy was liable in that degree for a crime against which he
has remonstrated.

LIABILITY FOR INJURY

BY CONTACT WITii

LIVE WIRE.

Negligence has often been defined as the absence of due
care under the circumstances. And it is quite well-established
that he who alleges negligence on the part of another must
show that there was from that other a duty owing him, the
breach of which duty constitutes the negligence alleged.*
Therefore, where there is no duty owing, there can be no negligence. It is on this ground that the occupiers of real property, although careless in the use of that which is on their land,
are excused for injuries caused to trespassers as the result of
such carelessness.
In the case of infant trespassers, many jurisdictions make
some exceptions, as in what are known as the "turntable cases,"
where infants, although trespassers, have been allowed to recover damages for injuries sustained while meddling with dangerous machinery on the land of the defendants, the courts
holding that the latter were bound to guard against such trespassers. 4
A slightly different question often arises where the injury
occurs through the carelessness of the defendant, but not on
his property. Such was the situation in Mullen v. Wilkes'People v. Vasquez, 49 CaL 56o.
'Turnpike Co. v. Railroad Co., 54 Pa. 345'Heaven v. Peuder, Ii Q. B. D. 503.
'Brady v. Prellyinan, 193 Pa. 628.
1R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wal. (U. S.) 57.
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Barre Gas and Electric Company, 38 Pa. Superior Ct. 3 (Advance Reports), decided February 26, i9o9. The plaintiff, a
boy of tender years, while at play climbed a chestnut tree
standing upon a sidewalk of a street, and was injured by coming in contact with a defectively insulated electric wire of the
defendant company. It appeared that the tree stood on premises not belonging to the company, and that it had no property
right of any kind in the tree or the premises on which it stood.
It was further shown that the defective insulation of the wire
in the branches of the tree had continued for a period of from
four to six months before the accident; that during this period
sparks had been emitted by the contact of wire and branches;
and that in pleasant weather the children of the neighborhood
were accustomed to assemble about the tree to play, and to
climb into it. The defendant conceded its obligation to keep
its wires safe as to those lawfully using the streets in the ordinary way, as well as to those who, in the exercise of some
right, might be required to approach them, but contended that
no such obligation existed as to children of immature age who
voluntarily placed themselves in dangerous proximity to its
wires stretched twenty feet above the ground.
The Court, speaking by Judge Head, held that the company's
position could not be sustained. Said the Court: "The tree
was the private property of the owner of the premises on
which it grew and the children seem to have enjoyed, at least
the permissive right from that owner, to play in its branches
and gather the nuts they bore. The plaintiff, therefore, in
climbing the tree was in no sense committing any trespass or
infringement upon any right of the defendant; nor did his act
need the aid of any invitation, permission or license from the
latter to keep it in the category of wholly innocent acts."
It will be seen that the Court based its decision on the ground
that the plaintiff was not a trespasser, either as against the defendant or as against the owner of the tree in whose branches
its wires were stretched. But even had the Court regarded
the plaintiff as a trespasser against the owner of the tree, the
result reached would in all probability have been the same,
uinder the authority of a well-known case 5 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania but a few years ago. There the
Court was of opinion that even if the plaintiff, a boy ten years
of age, were to be treated as a trespasser as against the owner
of the premises on which was located the wire which had
caused the plaintiff's injury, this fact could not be set up by
'Daltry v. Media Light Co., 2o8 Pa. 403.
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the company, which was itself a trespasser as against such
owner. It would seem, however, that even had the Court
regarded the defendant company as rightfully on the premises and the plaintiff a trespasser, it would have, nevertheless,
held the defendant liable. "It must be presumed," said Chief
Justice Mitchell, "that the company knew what the evidence
disclosed as a fact, that children used the lawn of the premises near the gateway and in the vicinity of the wire, as well
as the street in front of the premises as a playground." The
Court reiterated what it had said in a previous case, 6 that a
corporation which uses electricity of high voltage for lighting
purposes is bound not only to know the extent of the danger,
but to use the very highest degree of care practicable to avoid
injury to everyone who may be lawfully in proximity to its
wires and liable to come accidentally or otherwise in contact
with them.
In jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania, under facts showing that the plaintiff was a trespasser as against a third person
on whose premises the defendant's wires were stretched, and
where injury resulted to the plaintiff as a result of the defective condition of such wires, the decisions are in conflict. In
a comparatively recent case, 7 decided iii 1907, whose facts .were
very similar to those before the Superior Court in the case
under discussion, it was said: "The immemorial habit of small
boys to climb little oak trees filled with abundant branches
reaching almost to the ground is a habit which corporations
stretching their wires over such trees must take notice of.
This Court, so far as the exertion of its power in a legitimate
xvay is concerned, intends to exert that power so as to secure,
it the hands of these public utility corporations handling and
:ontrolling these extraordinarily dangerous agencies, the very
nighest degree of skill and care."
The contrary view is expressed in a case decided in the
Supreme Court of Michigan. 8 Said the Court: "The plaintiff
has conclusively shown a condition and relation of things
which as to himself and the public generally was safe and
harmless if not interfered with, has shown neither invitation
nor inducement warranting or excusing interference, and has
just as conclusively proven an interference, participated in by
himself, the character and results of which were not to be
'Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Co., 2o0 Pa. 540.

' Temple v. McComb City Electric Light & Power Co., 89 Miss. r.
'Stork v. Muskegon Traction & Lighting Co., 141 Mich. 575.
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reasonably apprehended or guarded against. Whether or not,
under the circumstances of this case, we apply the term 'trespasser' to one of the plaintiff's years, he was certainly a wrongdoer, who, but for his acts of wrongdoing, would not have
been injured."
Although the view taken in the case of Temple v. Electric
Light Co. (supra) seems to throw a very heavy burden on
corporations dealing in electricity, yet, it is submitted, it seems
sound. The ultimate question raised is whether to place upon
parents of young cnildren the duty of keeping them indoors,
or of allowing them to play outdoors after first thoroughly
grounling them in the law of technical trespass and its consequences, and endeavoring to stifle their natural instincts to
climb trees and wander on unenclosed premises, or to place
upon the public utility corporation handling such a dangerous
thing as electricity the duty of anticipating that children may
meddle with the wires carrying it where such wires are within
their reach. If we look upon the law as a system of rules for
human conduct in the ordinary affairs of life, it would seem
that in formulating that system account must be taken of the
fact that the same degree of care cannot be expected from
children who are quite young as from those who are more
mature in years, or from adults. This is apparently the view
of the courts of last resort in Pennsylvania in dealing with public utility corporations handling electricity respecting the liability of the latter to children injured by coming in contact
with defectively insulated wires, and it is submitted that it
seems to be economically and legally sound.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN AND RIGHT OF ACTION FOR COMPENSATION.

In the recent English case of In re Road Rapid Transit Co.,'
the rule concerning a solicitor's lien on documents was fully
stated. One Neely acted as solicitor of a company and was also
retained by the liquidator thereof, who subsequently discharged
him and appointed another, to whom the liquidator required
that Neely hand over the documents relating to the action,
which had come into Neely's hands before and after the order
for winding up the company. The Court held that the solicitor
had acquired a valid lien on documents that came to his hands
before the winding up order, which could not be defeated by
'L P_ xgog, i Chi. Div. 9&.

NOTES

the order, but that he had acquired no available lien on documents that had come into his hands after the winding up order.
In Englandan attorney or solicitor has possessory and charging liens for compensation for his services. He has a general
lien on all moneys of his client that come into his possession,
unless for a specific purpose.2 ie has a general lien 3 also on
documents that come into his possession in his professional capacity,' for professional services. This lien does not, however,
extend to testamentary papers,' public records, or papers acquired during the liquidation of a company. This lien is
passive and gives no right of sale or foreclosure. The documents can be forced to be delivered up by the client or those
claiming through him only when the attorney has discharged
himself and in some cases of great urgency, when the lien will
be protected. But if the party seeking the production of the
document be a stranger, the attorney can not resist on the
ground of his lien.' The above liens are possessory and are
lost by a voluntary surrender of possession.
In England there is also an attorney's lien on funds, assertable against the client and those claiming through him.7 This
is a charging lien and is a claim to equitable interference by
the court to have held as security for the attorney's costs the
judgment recovered at the close of the proceedings in which
the services were rendered. This lien is special and covers only
the services resulting in the judgment. This lien attaches
to whatever is due the client at the close of the proceedings,
with the exception of realty," or trust property administered
out of court, or the funds of a company wound up by the
court. This equitable interference will be exercised whenever the attorney has given the opposite party notice of his lien,
or, if there is fraud between the parties, in the absence of
notice. The opposite party then pays the client or releases
his claim without the consent of the attorney at his peril.' This
lien cannot, however, prevent a bona fide compromise. If
such a compromise is made the lien attaches to payments made

'Re Phoenix Life, i H. & M. 433.
'Ex parte Nesbitt, 2 Sch. & Lef. z79.

"Atkinson, Solic. Liens, Ch. III.
' Balch v. Synes, Turn. & R. 92.
' Hope v. Liddell, 7 D. M. & G. 331.

'Atkinson, Soli. Liens, Ch. IL
*Shaw v. Neale, 6 H. L. Ca. 581.
'Ross v. Buxtdn, ,2 Ch. Div. igo.
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under it. The lien on funds can be lost by waiver, the attorney's discharge of himself, or neglect.
Beside the above liens, an attorney can obtain from the
proper officer of the court a taxing order, which is in the
nature of a judgment and can be similarly enforced. Ile can
also bring action for his bill, whether taxed or not, one month
after delivery.
In the Un.ted States a member of any branch of the legal
profession has possessory and charging liens similar to those
allowed in England to solicitors and attorneys. So there is
a possessory lien on legal documents 10 and on moneys that
come into the attorney's hands."1 This, however, does not
extend to a will, public records, or money received for a specific purpose. So, also, an attorney in the United States has
a charging lien, which is an equitable right to be paid for his
services out of the proceeds of the judgment obtained by him.' 2
In such a case the attorney is regarded as the equitable assignee of the judgment. There is a conflict of jurisdictions
as to whether notice to the judgment debtor is necessary
to enforce this lien in the United States, some jurisdictions
holding that actual notice is necessary,13 and some holdhig that
pendency of the suit is sufficient notice as against the judgment
debtor.1 4 Attorneys' liens in the United States can be lost just
as in England.
An attorney in the United States can also recover compensation for services rendered underian express or implied contract. In some jurisdictions he m-ist deliver an itemized bill
of costs one month before the suit.'

LIMITS OF STATE CONTROL OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of the Unit-d States has recently held
constitutional I a statute of the State of Arkansas which prohibits any individual, corporation, etc., from entering into a
"pool or combination, whether the same is made in this State
or elsewhere," with any other individual, corporation, etc., "to
regulate or fix, either in this State or elsezwhere the price of
"McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 4o4.
"Sparks v. JlfcDonald,41 AtL 369.
Terney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. L 28z
Patrick v. Leach, 3 Fed. 433.
"Newbert v. Cunningham, 5o Me. 231.
'Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378 (1909).
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any article," etc. The Act further provides for judgment by
default in case of failure by any officer of the corporation to
produce when required "any books, papers and documents in
his possession, or under his control, relating to the merits of
any suit or to any defense therein ."2 In pursuance of such provisions judgment was entered by default in the case referred to.
By the proceedings in error two distinct, but equally important questions were raised, which it may be interesting to
note in order:
(i) Can a State declare that certain offences committed beyond its borders by corporations engaged in business within its
borders, shall disqualify such corporations from continuing
to transact business within the State? No question of the
interpretation of the statute was presented, since it had already been determined by the Supreme Court of Arkansas that
the statute was clearly intended to embrace offences beyond its
borders.3 The question of constitutionality in view of the Fourteenth Amendment was, therefore, fairly presented. That a
State can prohibit a corporation from doing business at all
within the State is well settled, 4 and it would seem to follow
reasonably that a State may provide upon what, terms a corporation may engage in business within the limits of the State,
even though some of the requirements concern qualifications
beyond the borders of the State; for if a State under its acknowledged power excludes a corporation entirely, the validity
of the exclusion will not be affected because the motive of the
exclusion was a consideration of acts done beyond the boundaries. So here, acts done outside the State may be considered
in prescribing upon what terms a corporation may engage in
business in the State at all. The motive in making the enactment has always been considered immaterial, for the test of
constitutionality is the power and not the molive.5 A prescription of terms to be complied with is entirely distinct from a
provision of penalties for offences committed beyond the
State's borders, the latter-being, of course, unconstitutional.
It will be noted, however, that the statute endeavored to include within its provisions not only corporations, but "indi'Act of Jan. 23, i905, Secs, 1, 8 and 9.

*HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. State, 76 Ark. 303 (i9o5).
"Moses v. State, 65 Miss. 56 (1887); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 169
(1868).
aEx parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 5o6, 514; Doyle v. ContinentalIns. Co.,
94 U. S. 535.
'State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. iog; People v. Merrill, 2 Park Cr. R. 59.
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viduals." By force of the very reasoning above it is clear
that such provision is unconstitutional. A State cannot forbid
inlividuals to do business within its limits; 7 a fortiori, it cannot discriminate against the employment of foreign-born employees, for example.' The Arkansas statute was, therefore,
invalid in this respect, and this is conceded by the Court; but
since these provisions of the statute had been treated by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas as separable from the rest, 0 the
validity of the law as to corporations was not affected.
(2) Are the provisions constitutional which require the giving of testimony and the production of books, papers, etc., relating to the merits of any suit or to any defense therein?
It has been decided by the United States Supreme Court that
a corporation can be compelled to produce documents, etc., and
that the officers of a corporation cannot refuse to answer questions on the ground of incrimination.'
The Court asserts that
"while an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it
does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when
charged with an abuse of such privileges." 12 And this view
is followed in Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont," even
though the books required to be produced were outside the4
State at the time; while in the case of Twining v. New Jersey,"
it was held that even in the case of individuals, exemption
from compulsory self-incrimination in the State courts is not
secured by any part of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, since an action to exclude a foreign corporation from the
State is a civil action, the requirement that it should give
evidence against itself has been held not to be unconstitutional." That such requirement does not violate the provisions
against unreasonable searches has also been decisively determined.1 '
But whether such statute, applying only to those engaged in
'Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 570.
Junioata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193 (x898).
'At page 377.
"Hartford Fire Ios. Co. v. State, supra.
" Hale v. Henkel, 2or U. S. 43 (g05).
'At page 75.
'207 U. S. 541 0907).
"25 U. S. 78 (19o8).
"'Statev. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28 (igoo).
"Consolidated Co. v. Vermont, supra.
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the offence of "pooling," etc., is a "reasonable classification"

as required by law, 7 appears to be a more difficult question in
that it might well be contended that it is not "equal protection
of the laws" for a defendant, accused of "pooling" to be compelled to testify against himself, while a defendant accused of
"rebating," for example, need not so testify; or for a corporation to be compelled to testify against itself, where admittedly an individual would not be so subject to compulsion.
The latter objection to the classification, however, is met by
the inherent distinctions between corporations and individuals,
a corporation being the creature of the State and, therefore,
amenable to those provisions which a State may deceil essential
to the regulation and control of such corporation. The objection that under the equal protection of the laws any one offence cannot be selected, and self-incrimination required in its
prosecution while not required in the prosecution of other
offenses, is more vital. It amounts to the contention that, if
such legislation is constitutional, then any State may provide
a different kind of trial for each kind of offense, and a burglar,
for example, may receive a much more favorable method of
trial than a prisoner guilty of arson, etc., etc. It is evident that
such a requirement cannot be in the nature of a penalty, else
it would be a penalty for being accused.
It is submitted that the true interpretation of "equal protection of the laws" is that as long as all members of the same class
receive equal protection, it is quite true that the State is at
entire liberty to provide distinct methods of procedure for distinct classes of crime, and this view is directly supported by the
case of Maxwell v. Dow." There the Court upheld a statute
of Utah which provided that all crimes except capital cases
should be tried with eight jurors, in the courts of higher jurisdiction, and four jurors in courts of inferior jurisdiction; all
capital cases to be tried with twelve jurors.
The striking out of the defendant's pleadings and the entry
of judgment by default raises the question whether such judgment was obtained by due process of law. The case of Hovey
v. Elliott 19 had decided that to punish for contempt by striking
an answer from the files and condemning, as by default, was
a denial of due process of law. There the Court had inflicted
the penalty of its own supposed inherent power, unsanctioned
by any legislative act; but, as was pointed out in that case, the
if Gulf, Colorado & Santa F Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. I5o (z896).

"76 U. S. 58s (1899).
"167 U. S. 409 0896).
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mere authority of the Legislature could not validate such action
if it was inherently unconstitutional, and, therefore, the Arkansas Court, if its action were merely a punishment for contempt, woul not be protected by the statute. But there is a
well recognized distinction between m,:re punishment for contempt, and the creation of a presumption of fact to be drawn
from the failure of a party to a cause specially to set up or
assert his supposed rights in the mode prescribed by law. 20
And the power of a Legislature to create such presumptions
is at the basis of all judgments by default provided for in almost every jurisdiction at the present time, and is unquestioned,-in the case of the Federal Courts being bestowed expressly by statute."'

FORFEITURE

OF CORPORATE

PRIVILEGE BY COMBINATION.

The Supreme Court of Missouri recently handed down a
most interesting and valuable opinion in the case of State v.
Standard Oil Co. (1I6 S. V. 9o2). This was an information
in the nature of a quo warranto .brought by Win. Hadley, at
that time Attorney General of the State, to revoke the licenses
of the Republic Co. and the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana to
do business in Missouri, and forfeit the charter of the WatersPierce Oil Co., on the ground that they had formed a combination in restraint of trade, against the Anti-Trust statutes of
Missouri.
These statutes were passed in I899, and were substantially
similar to those now in use in many other States. They provided, among other things, that "any person who should create
or enter into a pool to fix the prices and control the supply
of any commodity, should be deemed guilty of conspiracy,"
and provided that any corporation which should be found
guilty, should forfeit its charter, if organized under the laws
of Missouri, or have its license revoked, if it were a foreign
organization doing business in the State.
The charge of the Attorney-General was that since i9OI
the three corporations mentioned above had violated the antitrust regulations under somewhat the following facts as found
by the Master.
The Waters-Pierce Company, organized in Missouri, in 1878,
-Illinois C. R. Co. v. Sandford, 75 Miss. 862 (1898); Lawson v.
Black Diamond Coal Min. Co., 44 Wash. 26 (igo6).
=U. S. Rev. Stat., Sec. 724.
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and reorganized in i9oo; the Republic Company, licensed to do
business in Missouri in l9oi, and the Standard Oil Company

of Indiana, licensed in 1897-in each of which the Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey owned a large majority of the
stock-entered into a business arrangement whereby the State
was divided into two sections, in one of which the WatersPierce Company was to have entire rights of sale, in the other
the Standard Oil; while in order to keep up the appearance
of competition the Republic Company, which sold a peculiar
kind of oil known as Palacine Oil, was to have certain limited
rights in each of the two divisions mentioned. Each party
agreed to buy only from the Standard Oil and its allied interests, and to sell to, no independents.
It was further shown by the evidence that prices were dictated from the Standard Oil Company's St. Louis agent, and
that these prices were regulated, not by any law of consumption or cost of production, but by the distance from an independent concern. And, finally, it was shown that the books of
each of the companies was audited by the Standard's general
auditor at New York City.
The Master found these facts to show a conspiracy, which
the respondents denied, contending also that the proceedings
instituted against them were unconstitutional.
The Court held (i) in answer to respondent's contention
that this was a criminal prosecution, and that quo warranto
could not be used as a criminal procedure, -that a Proceeding
in the Nature of a Quo Warranto was the proper form of action in such a case; that the violation of the statute did not
make the companies guilty of a crime to be prosecuted under
indictment before court and jury before such an action as this
could be maintained, this being, not a criminal prosecution, but
a civil procedure on information, to oust respondents from
doing business in the State; and, therefore, the Court would
have jurisdiction.
(2) The Attorney-General is authorized to institute quo
warrantoproceedings against any corporation to annul its-charter or forfeit its franchises whenever it has so conducted itself
as to violate the laws of its being or the criminal laws of the
State; and if on trial the corporation is found guilty, the decree
of forfeiture must go, with the addition of penalties if the
Court sees fit. "This, however, does not proceed upon the
theory that the corporation has been guilty of a crime and
that it is being punished therefor; but upon the idea that there
is an implied agreement on the part of every corporation, -by
accepting its charter, that it will perform its obligations to the
public, and that by failing to do so it conmmits an act of for-
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feiture which may be enforced by the State in the present
way."
(3) The statutes were found by the Court not to be penal
and in derogation of the counon law, though they provided
for the forfeiture of charters of corporations, but were rather
intended to be in aid of an(l supplementary to the common law,
and, therefore, of a remedial nature, and as such should be
loosely construed, though heavy damages were prescribed and
penalties imposed for their violation.
(4a) The Court held that the ist Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution was not violated, and that this
was not, as respondent claimed, the imposition of a different
and greater punishment than that imposed on an individual for
the same offence, the argument being that man being a natural
person, has no charters to forfeit, so that the same mode of
punishiient cannot be meted out to both; and that to allow such
a plea would practically limit the State's right against either
an individual or a corporation to a fine.
( 4 b) The Interstate Commerce clause of the Constitution
was likewise found not to apply, since while the State has no
power to prevent corporations from engaging in inter-state
trade, that being a Congressional function, it has the power to
revoke a license which only authorized a foreign corporation
to do an intra-state business.
(4c) The Court thought that the requirement that respondents produce their books on pain of judgment by default, was
not a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Constitution, since a corporation, being a creature of the State,
has no constitutional right to refuse to produce its books on
trial, as opposed to the individual.
(4d) Nor that the statutes tended toward the impairment
of contracts under the constitutional provision that no State
shall enact laws which would impair the obligations of a contract. This section of the Constitution, according to the Court,
had no application to a license to a foreign corporation to do
business in a State, since when it accepted that license it impliedly agreed to transact business under the laws of that State
in the same manner as domestic corporations, and subjected
itself to the same penalties in case of their violation; and the
mere fact that the licenses granted to the Indiana and- Republic
Companies were granted prior to the enactment of some of
the provisions of the statutes in question, did not affect the
legal aspect of the matter, since the enactment of the statutes
was but the exercise of the police power of the State, which
could not be contracted away or surrendered by legislation.
(4e) Finally, the Court held that the statutes in question did
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not abridge the rights of respondents as prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con.titution, since that amendment
does not prohibit the Legi.,lature from the exercise of the general police power of the State, the Slatv having right, under
that power, to enact valid laws requiring each citizen to so
conduct himself and so to use his property as not to necessarily
injure others. The statutes contended againt were buttomed
on that police power which was inherent in all State sovereignty; they were enacted to restrain, not the reasonable, but
only the unbridled use by a citizen of his property; and such
reasonable restraint has never been held an unconsNtitutional
deprivation of property.
The Court thus found that the statutes tnder which the suit
was brought were not an infringement upon the provisions of
the Federal Constitution.
On the last point of the case, the real crux of the question,
as to whether the admitted facts amounted to a conspiracy, the
Court decided, after an exhaustive review of the evidence, that
the agreement (lid amount to an illegal pool within the meaning of the statute. "The chief consideration," said the Court
in reaching its conclusion, "in determining-whether a monopoly exists, is not that prices are raised and competition destroyed, but does the power exist in the combine to raise prices
or to destroy competition at pleasure;" and in applying this
succinct statement to the facts of the case, the Court found
that the agreement, to use the picturesque language of Judge
Lamm, "was born in original corporate sin, and begotten in
corporate iniquity."
(5) As a result of its findings, the Court annulled the charter of the Waters-Pierce Company, and the licenses of the
others, imposing a heavy fine, as well, on each of the respondents.
The case is a very interesting one as an illustration of the
development of the success of a government in dealing with a
powerful corporation. In the earlier years of the combat, it
was usually worsted, but the tide seems to be turning, and the
time may not be far distant when each jurisdiction having
recognized, as Missouri has, the value of employing eminent
counsel, may be able to solve the seemingly insolvable trustproblem. The statute which rendered possible the decision in
question is well worth study as a curb on monopolies that has
stood the test; and its language might, therefore, serve as a
good model for similar legislation in other jurisdictions.

